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Abstract
The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Or-
der (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theo-
rists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order 
mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a 
higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argu-
ment confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of conscious-
ness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is 
either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion.
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According to so-called Higher-Order (HO) theories of conscious-
ness, a mental state is conscious if and only if there is a suitable high-
er-order mental state (either a thought or a perception) about it. One 
of the best known objections to HO theories was first put forward by 
Alvin Goldman over two decades ago:
A rock does not become conscious when someone has a belief about it. 
Why should a first-order psychological state become conscious simply 
by having a belief about it? (Goldman 1993: 366)
Leopold Stubenberg (1998) called this ‘the problem of the rock’ 
(PoR). Robert van Gulick (2000) used the term ‘generality problem’ 
for a nearly identical objection, differing mainly in its substitution of 
a desk lamp for Goldman’s rock.
HO theorists have responded to PoR in a number of different 
ways. (See Gennaro 2005 for an overview.) The most obvious re-
sponse is to deny the validity of the generalization from mental states 
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to rocks (or desk lamps). In this paper I will argue that there is a more 
fundamental problem for PoR, however: it depends on an equivoca-
tion of two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness.
Before we can properly assess PoR, there are two minor defects 
in Goldman’s original phrasing of the problem that need to be cor-
rected. Firstly, as Rocco Gennaro (2005) has pointed out before, the 
term ‘belief’ is somewhat inappropriate here. HO theories claim that 
the higher-order state is either a thought (in Higher-Order Thought 
theories) or a perception (in Higher-Order Perception theories), but 
not that it is a belief. (On the other hand, if in some HO theory 
thoughts and/or perceptions are considered to be kinds of beliefs, 
then for that theory the term ‘belief’ might be acceptable.)
Secondly, it is not entirely clear how ‘becoming conscious’ should 
be understood here (i.e. temporally, causally, etc.). The most neutral 
reading equates it with ‘being conscious’, and that is probably the 
most charitable reading as well.
Taking these corrections into account, the second sentence of the 
above quote should be understood as an interrogative version of the 
claim that:
(1) A mental state x is conscious if and only if someone has a 
thought about/perception of x,
which summarizes Goldman’s apparent interpretation of HO the-
ories. Whether this interpretation is entirely correct is debatable. 
At the very least, the word ‘suitable’ needs to be inserted before 
‘thought’. Nevertheless, in order to focus on the aforementioned 
more fundamental problem, I will let it pass and assume that (1) is an 
acceptable summary of the main claim of HO theories.
Goldman’s point is that, lacking a good argument to the contrary, 
we should be able to generalize (1) to:
(2) Any x is conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/
perception of x,
from which it follows that:
(3) A rock is conscious if and only if someone has a thought 
about/perception of that rock.
However, (3) is false because rocks are not conscious, and therefore, 
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(1) is false. Or at least, that is—supposedly—what the enthyme-
matic conclusion of PoR should be.
In one of the earliest responses to PoR, David Rosenthal (1997) 
appealed to a distinction between transitive consciousness of some-
thing and intransitive being conscious, and charged PoR of being 
“just a disguised version of the doctrine that being intransitively con-
scious is an intrinsic property” (1997: 739). Intrinsic properties are 
non-relational—that is, they do not consist (even partly) in “bear-
ing a relation to something else” (1997: 736). If PoR would indeed 
presume that intransitive consciousness is intrinsic, then this would 
be begging the question against HO theories, because those assume 
consciousness of any kind to be a relational property. However, it 
has been disputed that PoR depends on this assumption. Alex Byrne 
(1997), for example, argues that it is more likely to follow from PoR 
than lead to it. (See also Gennaro 2005.) The distinction between 
transitive and intransitive consciousness, on the other hand, is essen-
tial to understanding PoR, but insufficiently fine-grained.
The transitive/intransitive distinction is (at least originally) a 
grammatical distinction between two kinds of verbs. Transitive verbs 
take two arguments. For example, ‘John is eating a steak’ and ‘Jane 
opens the door’. Intransitive verbs take only one argument: ‘John is 
eating’ and ‘the door opens’. The verbs in these examples, ‘eating’ 
and ‘opening’, are really ambitransitive verbs, meaning that they can 
be both transitive and intransitive. If we bracket ‘of’ in ‘being con-
scious (of)’, then that phrase appears to be similarly ambitransitive.
There are (at least) two kinds of ambitransitive verbs, which is 
illustrated in the two examples in the previous paragraph. The agent 
of intransitive ‘eating’ is the agent of transitive ‘eating’, while the 
agent of intransitive ‘opening’ is the patient of transitive ‘opening’. 
For that reason, ‘eating’ is called an ‘agentive ambitransitive’ and 
‘opening’ a ‘patientive ambitransitive’.
Usually, the intransitive form of an ambitransitive verb can have 
either the agent or the patient of the transitive form as its sole argu-
ment, and is thus either an agentive or a patientive ambitransitive, 
but there are also a few verbs that are doubly ambiguous. Such verbs 
are ambitransitive, but unlike most ambitransitives, they can take 
either argument as the sole argument of the intransitive form. For 
example, transitive ‘Linda is flying this plane over Siberia’ has two 
Lajos Brons8
related intransitive sentences: ‘Linda is flying over Siberia’ and ‘this 
plane is flying over Siberia’. Such verbs appear to be rare, however, 
but ‘being conscious (of)’ works (more or less) like such a verb, and 
this is a source of (potential) confusion. As an illustration, consider 
the following three sentences:
(a) Jake is conscious of his thought about breakfast.
(b) Jake is conscious.
(c) The [i.e. Jake’s] thought about breakfast is conscious.
In (a) ‘being conscious (of)’ is transitive; in (b) and (c) it is intransi-
tive, but while it takes the agent of the transitive form as its argu-
ment in (b), the argument of (c) is the patient of the transitive form. 
In other words, (b) attributes (some kind of) consciousness to an 
agent, and (c) to a patient. For that reason, I will refer to these two 
different kinds of intransitive consciousness as agent-consciousness 
and patient-consciousness, respectively. There is a further complica-
tion, however.
The transitivity of ‘being conscious of’ in (a) can be represent-
ed symbolically as ⟨1,1⟩ in which the order is ⟨agent,patient⟩ and in 
which ‘1’ marks presence of an argument and ‘0’ marks omission. 
In the same notation, the transitivity in (c)—that is, of patient-
consciousness—is ⟨0,1⟩. In that sentence, the agent is omitted and 
the patient is promoted to grammatical subject similar to the pas-
sive voice. Analogously, the transitivity in (b) could be interpreted as ⟨1,0⟩ similar to the antipassive voice (which does not exist in English, 
but that does not matter here), but that is not the only possibility.
A genuinely ambitransitive verb is ⟨1,1⟩ in its transitive form and 
either ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨0,1⟩ in its intransitive form (the first if its agentive, the 
second if it is patientive), but there also are quasi-ambitransitive verbs 
that act like ambitransitive verbs grammatically, but that have ⟨1⟩ intran-
sitive forms that differ subtly in meaning from their transitive forms.
The difference between ⟨1,0⟩ and ⟨1⟩ can be illustrated by means 
of a comparison of ‘eating’ and ‘falling’. If John is eating, then he 
is eating something, but if the ball falls, then the ball is not falling 
anything (and neither is anything falling the ball). In other words, 
the ambitransitive verb ‘eating’ implies a hidden argument even in its 
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intransitive form—that is what the ‘0’ in ⟨1,0⟩ means. But a genu-
inely intransitive verb—like ‘falling’—has no such implication, and 
should thus be represented as ⟨1⟩.
‘Walking’ and ‘flying’ are examples of quasi-ambitransitives. The 
first can be transitive as in ‘Sophie is walking the dog’ or ‘Hanako 
is walking a long-distance trail’ and intransitive as in ‘Margaret is 
walking’, but the last sentence does not imply that Margaret is walk-
ing something (i.e. a pet, or some route or path), and therefore, the 
transitivity of ‘walking’ in that sentence is ⟨1⟩. The same applies to 
‘the pilot flies the plane’ and ‘the bird flies’. Importantly, there are 
subtle differences in meaning between the transitive and intransitive 
forms of ‘walking’ and ‘flying’—and there must be, given that the 
intransitive forms have no implied patients—and perhaps it can be 
argued for that reason these are not really grammatically different 
forms of the same verb but closely related homonyms. For the same 
reason, if agent-consciousness is ⟨1⟩ rather than ⟨1,0⟩, then it does 
not express the (exact) same concept as transitive consciousness, and 
is probably not reducible to it.
While transitive consciousness and patient-consciousness can be 
easily characterized as ⟨1,1⟩ and ⟨0,1⟩, respectively, it is not clear—
and certainly not uncontroversial—whether agent -consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨1⟩.1 Furthermore, different positions with regards to HO 
theories most likely also differ in their interpretation of agent-con-
sciousness as either ⟨1⟩ or ⟨1,0⟩. And if that is the case, then there is 
no non-question-begging definition of agent-consciousness. Never-
theless, even if we cannot uncontroversially define agent-conscious-
ness, there is at least one important feature that follows in either 
interpretation.
Patient-consciousness is ⟨0,1⟩ and is, therefore, defined as in (4). 
If agent-consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩, then it just omits the other argument 
and is, therefore, analogously defined as in (5*). (The asterisk marks 
that (5*) is true only if agent-consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩.)
(4) ∀x [x is patient-conscious ↔def. ∃y [y is conscious of x]]
1 My own opinion on the matter is that the notion of ⟨1⟩ intransitive conscious-
ness is confused nonsense (and the main cause of most philosophical problems 
about consciousness), and thus that any occurrence of intransitive consciousness 
is either ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨0,1⟩, but I will not defend this opinion here.
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(5*) ∀x [x is ⟨1,0⟩agent-conscious ↔def. ∃y [x is conscious of y]]
In either case, intransitive consciousness is defined in terms of a 
primitive concept of transitive consciousness (i.e. ‘being conscious 
of’, ‘being aware of’, etc.). No such definition of agent-consciousness 
is possible if ‘being conscious’ in that sense is really ⟨1⟩ intransitive, 
because in that case, it does not express the (exact) same concept as 
the transitive variant. However, even in that case there appears to be 
an uncontroversial conceptual relation with transitive consciousness: 
it seems undeniable that being agent-conscious at least implies the 
possibility of being conscious of something:
(6) ∀x [x is agent-conscious → ◇ (∃y [x is conscious of y])]
If it is accepted that p implies ◇p, then (6) also follows from (5*), 
and consequently, (6) is true regardless of whether agent-conscious-
ness is ⟨1⟩ or ⟨1,0⟩.
(6) obviously implies a restriction to what kinds of things can be 
agent -conscious, namely things that can be transitively conscious of 
something, but no similar restriction is implied by (4): anything can 
be patient-conscious, and something can even be agent- and patient -
conscious at the same time. If two people are having a conversation, 
they are both simultaneously agent- and patient -conscious.2
The first premise of the Problem of the Rock (PoR) is a summary 
of HO theories, repeated here for convenience:
(1) A mental state x is conscious if and only if someone has a 
thought about/perception of x.
PoR is about intransitive consciousness, and therefore, ‘is conscious’ 
in (1) is either agent-consciousness or patient-consciousness. Be-
cause the subject of (1) is a mental state, ‘is conscious’ can be agent- 
consciousness only if mental states are a kind of thing that can be 
conscious of something (i.e. not just about something, but conscious 
of that thing). As far as I know, no HO theorist ever claimed that 
mental states can be conscious agents or can be conscious of things 
2 If Jane is conversing with John, then (a) Jane is conscious of John, and there-
fore (a1) Jane is agent-conscious and (a2) John is patient-conscious; and (b) John 
is conscious of Jane, and therefore, (b1) John is agent-conscious and (b2) Jane is 
patient-conscious.
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(in this sense), and therefore, this interpretation would misrepre-
sent HO theories. Furthermore, even if HO theories would claim 
that mental states can be conscious agents, it would not follow that 
anything can be a conscious agent as asserted by (2), because (6) 
implicitly restricts agent-consciousness to particular kinds of things. 
Consequently, if ‘being conscious’ in PoR is agent-consciousness, 
then the argument is not just a straw man (because it misrepresents 
HO theories), but invalid as well.
Alternatively, if ‘is conscious’ in (1) is patient-consciousness, then 
from (4) it follows that someone (or something) is conscious of that 
state, and that appears to be exactly what HO theorists are claiming. 
Hence, we can disambiguate (1) as follows:3
(7) A mental state x is patient-conscious if and only if someone 
has a thought about/perception of x.
From (4) it follows that the left-hand side of the biconditional in (7) 
implies that there is some y that is conscious of x, and any sensible 
interpretation identifies that y with the ‘someone’ in the right-hand 
side of (7). Thus:
(8) For a mental state x, ∃y [y is conscious of x if and only if y has 
a thought about/perception of x] ,
which can be generalized into:
(9) ∀x ∃y [y is conscious of x if and only if y has a thought about/
perception of x].
And that—properly understood—is all that (2) means.
The rock in (3) is either agent-conscious or patient-conscious. 
It cannot be the first because (1) and (2) turn out to be about pa-
tient-consciousness, so if (3) would be about agent-consciousness, 
then it would not follow. Therefore, (3)—like (1) and (2)—is about 
patient-consciousness:
(10) A rock is patient-conscious if and only if someone has a 
thought about/perception of that rock.
And from (4) and (10)—or from (9)—it then follows that someone 
3 Of course, the acceptability of (7) depends on the acceptability of (1) as a sum-
mary of HO theories, and as mentioned above, there are other problems with (1).
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is conscious of a rock if and only if that person has a thought about/
perception of that rock. If ‘consciousness’ in (3) is patient-conscious-
ness, then that is all that (3) means. But there is nothing objection-
able to (3) understood as such (aside perhaps, from the fact that we 
usually do not use the adjective ‘conscious’ in this way in English).
The enthymematic conclusion of PoR depends on the suggestion 
that HO theories imply that rocks are agent-conscious (and thus that 
rocks have consciousness and can be conscious of things), but that 
suggestion is based on an equivocation fallacy. If (1) is to be a repre-
sentation of the central claim of HO theories, then it is about patient-
consciousness, and then no conclusion about agent-consciousness can 
follow. If the equivocation is avoided, then either PoR misrepresents 
HO theories (and thus is a straw man), or it states (the rather obvious 
fact) that someone is conscious of a rock if she has a thought about 
that rock or perceives that rock. Neither is problematic for HO theo-
ries. Therefore, there is no Problem of the Rock.4
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